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Abstract 
The purpose of the study is to examine the relationship between monitoring taxpayers’ compliance and local 
revenue performance in local government: a case of lira district local government, Uganda. A cross sectional 
descriptive survey design was used and data were gathered from 169 out of 191 tax administrators composed of 
technocrats and political leaders from Lira district. The study revealed that there is a positive significant (0.727) 
relationship between Monitoring Taxpayers’ compliance and Local Revenue Performance in Lira District Local 
Government. The study was largely quantitative in nature and data collection was done at a single point in time 
which does not allow for changes in behavior over time. The study is limited by factors like the study being largely 
quantitative in nature, data collection was done at a single point in time which does not allow for changes in 
behavior over time and considered only Lira district local Government. Future studies should consider being 
longitudinal in nature as well as extending to other local government districts of Uganda. The Practical implications 
is to improve Local revenue performance in local government, Local government should consider empowering of 
taxpayers with relevant knowledge and skills considered vital in the expedition of their tax obligations with easy 
and to enable them be aware of their moral obligation to register for tax purposes, report promptly for tax purposes, 
timely payment of tax obligation and there should be massive sensitization programs to increase awareness, 
educate the public and remind taxpayers that they are partners, as opposed to mere subjects forced to pay taxes. 
This study contributes to literature in the areas of monitoring taxpayers’ compliance and local revenue collection 
performance. 
Keywords: Taxation, Monitoring, Taxpayers’ Compliance, Local Revenue and performance. 
 
1.0 Background  
A sound and effective revenue system for Local Governments is an essential pre-condition for the success of fiscal 
decentralization (Bird, 2010; Martinez-Vazques & Smoke, 2010). In addition to raising revenues, Local Revenue 
mobilization has the potential to foster political and administrative accountability by empowering communities 
(OECD, 2009). Local governments raise their revenues through taxation However; the local revenue tax bases in 
local governments are undermined by widespread tax evasion in the developing and developed nations making it 
hard for local governments to raise required Local Revenue for its normal functioning (IMF, 2011). 
With decentralization, raising local revenue is therefore a priority for most Local Governments in Sub-
Saharan African countries (Drummond, Daal, & Oliveira, 2012). Mobilizing revenue is a way for Local 
Governments’ to create fiscal space, provide essential public services, and reduce foreign aid and single resource 
dependence. Although taxpayer non compliance is a continual and growing global problem ‐ (McKerchar & Evans, 
2009); many indications suggest that local governments in developing countries, many of them in Sub Saharan ‐
Africa, are the hardest hit. 
With decentralization and its inception in the late 1990s in Uganda instilled so much hope in the people of 
Uganda as they anticipated that Local Governments would improve on revenue collection and service delivery. In 
the present, many challenges have buried these hopes as local government revenues keep declining all the time. 
There are claims that Local Government officials and politicians connive with tax payers to amass wealth from 
corrupt acts at the expense of masses (Fumihiko, 2008). 
In conformity with the 1995 constitution of the republic of Uganda, Article 177 (I) provide for 
decentralization system of governance with districts at the top of the administrative units. Under Article 191(1) of 
the Constitution, Local Governments are allowed to levy, charge, collect, and appropriate fees and taxes in 
accordance with any law enacted by the Parliament by virtue of Article 152 (2) of the constitution. Article 191 (2) 
specifies the fees and taxes to be levied, charged, collected and appropriated to include; rents, rates, royalties, 
stamp duties fees on registration and licensing and any other fees and taxes that parliament may prescribe. 
The power and authority to levy and collect fees and taxes are provided under section 80 (3) of the Local 
Government Act (CAP 243). The Local Government Act (CAP 243) supports Local Governments to levy and 
collect local revenues from sources stipulated in the Fifth Schedule. Local revenues provide the most discretionary 
source of financing and are therefore important for the success and long-term sustainability of infrastructure and 
service delivery in local governments. Local Collections are used for councilors’ emoluments, co-funding capital 
development projects, providing bursaries, building administrative headquarters, operation and maintenance of 
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infrastructural facilities, co-funding of donor funded projects among others. This funding source is therefore 
instrumental in sustaining decentralization and service provision at local level therefore; a sound revenue system 
for local governments is an essential pre-condition for the success of fiscal decentralization (Bird, 2010; Martinez-
Vazques & Smoke, 2010; Olowu & Wunsch, 2003).  
However, over the last decade, the inadequacy of locally generated revenue has remained a major challenge 
for LGs and its poor collection has threatened to undermine the successes so far made under the policy of 
decentralization in Uganda (Seatini & Oxfam, 2013). In an attempt to relieve local governments of the problem of 
low local revenue collections, and reverse the tendency of failure to finance their mandated functions, the 
Parliament of Uganda passed the Local Governments Amendment Act No.2 of 2008, introducing new taxes for 
Local Governments i.e., Local Service Tax and Local Hotel Tax amongst others. In spite of this intervention, the 
performance of local revenue remains low. Although a number of factors have been advanced to cause low revenue 
collection Performance in Lira such as : (1) poor administrative capacity to assess the revenue base; (2) poor 
administrative capacity to enforce the taxes; (3) explicit and intentional tax evasion and resistance from taxpayers; 
(4) corruption, including embezzlement of revenues; (5) external pressure on the local finance department to 
provide optimistic projections; and (6) political pressure on the local tax administration to relax on revenue 
collection( Seatini & Oxfam, 2013)level, this study is undertaken to examine the relationship between Monitoring 
Taxpayers’ Compliance and Local Revenue Performance in Lira District Local Government. Monitoring of 
Taxpayers’ Compliance plays an important role in compliance but is often ignored by public and tax policy makers 
(Balunywa, Nangoli, Mugerwa, Teko, & Mayoke, 2014).  
Taxpayers’ compliance includes true reporting of the tax base, correct computation of the liability, and timely 
payment of the amounts due. Failure to monitor taxpayers’ compliance would lead to low proportion of locally 
generated revenue and high level of tax evasion hence, low Local Revenue Performance Balunywa at el (2014) 
added. This sets the basis for the researcher to investigate the relationship between Monitoring Taxpayers’ 
Compliance and Local Revenue performance. 
 
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
Under the Local Government Act (1997), the central government funds the local governments through the 
provision of unconditional, conditional, and equalization grants. Local governments also collect local revenues 
that constitute part of their domestic budget. However, over the last decade, the inadequacy of locally generated 
revenue has remained a major challenge for LGs and its poor collection has threatened to undermine the successes 
so far made under the policy of decentralization in Uganda (Tax Policy 2013). In an attempt to relieve Local 
Governments of the dilemma of low local revenue collections, and reverse the tendency of failure to finance their 
mandated functions, the Parliament of Uganda passed the Local Governments Amendment Act No.2 of 2008, 
introducing new taxes for Local Governments i.e., Local Service Tax and Local Hotel Tax. Despite several 
interventions of Monitoring Taxpayers’ Compliance to increase Local Revenue Performance in Lira District Local 
Government such as Strengthening Local Revenue data management, follow up, organizing continuous tax 
education and awareness of taxpayers on the collection, utilization and accountability of local revenues; and 
putting revenues to visible social services and infrastructure to ensure compliance in tax payment, Lira District 
Local governments have not registered significant improvement in Local Revenue Performance. The study was 
conducted to find the impact of Monitoring Taxpayers’ Compliance on Local Revenue Performance in Lira District 
Local Government. Based on this, the following three research questions are formulated to guide the study: 
i. What is the level of Monitoring Taxpayers’ Compliance in Lira District Local Government? 
ii. What is the level of Local Revenue Performance in Lira District Local Government?  
iii. What is the relationship between Monitoring Taxpayers’ Compliance and Local Revenue 
Performance in Lira District Local Government? 
 
1.2 Hypothesis of the Study 
The research will be based on the null hypothesis of no relationship between Monitoring Taxpayers’ Compliance 
and Local Revenue Performance in Lira District Local Government. 
 
1.3 Scope of the Study 
The study concentrated on Monitoring Taxpayers’ Compliance being the independent variable and Local Revenue 
Performance being the dependent variable. The study focused on effectiveness of Taxpayers’ Registration, Timely 
Reporting, and Timely payment of all tax obligations. Local Revenue Performance was assessed in terms of actual 
local revenue as a percentage of annual district budgets and level of tax evasion. The researcher considered time 
of data collection to be enough to measure the relationship between Monitoring Taxpayers’ Compliance and Local 
Revenue Performance. The study was carried out in Lira District Local Government. Lira District is located in 
Lango sub-region in Northern Uganda and is bordered by the districts of Pader and Otuke in the North and North 
East, Alebtong in the East, Dokolo in the South and Apac in the West. 
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1.4 Limitations of the Study 
This study was not without limitation although the study provides some interesting findings and makes important 
contributions to Monitoring Taxpayers’ Compliance and Local Revenue Performance literature, several potential 
limitations are worth noting. The study was largely quantitative in nature and data collection was done at a single 
point in time which does not allow for changes in behavior over time. The use of qualitative longitudinal studies 
with in-depth interviews could provide more insights.  The study population was limited to technocrats who are 
the implementers of tax collection and political leaders who are policy makers on tax, leaving out taxpayers who 
if may be added will give reasons as to why they are not paying tax obligation on time and help to work formalities 
with Lira district Local Government to monitor compliance.  
 
2. Literature Review  
2.1 Monitoring Taxpayers’ Compliance 
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (2008) noted that, in an ideal world, all citizens and 
businesses would satisfy their obligations under the tax law to register where specifically required, and to 
voluntarily declare and pay on time their tax liabilities, all calculated fully and accurately in accordance with the 
law. This statement encapsulates three basic tax compliance obligations of citizens and businesses that generally 
speaking must be administered by all local government in accordance with their respective tax laws: to effectively 
register for tax purposes; to correctly and timely report tax liabilities (including as withholding agents); and to pay 
taxes on time (i.e. by the date stipulated in the law).Monitoring taxpayers’ compliance was also seen to comprise 
of effective taxpayers’ registration, timely reporting and timely payment of all tax obligations(Torglar, 2011). 
2.2.1 Effective Taxpayers’ Registration 
Effective taxpayers’ registration is one of the most important aspects of tax compliance. This is because, as more 
taxpayers are identified and registered, the taxpayers that would otherwise evade are reduced. Hence, (Bird, 2010), 
noted that if taxpayers are identified and effectively registered, revenue collection would increases. Therefore 
emphasis should be on identification and effective registration of taxpayers in local government in order to increase 
the base, which is also taxpayer identification and registration (Kogler, Batrancea, Nichita, Pántya, Belianin, & 
Kirchler, 2012). However according to (Nkote & Tusubira, 2013), many small and medium taxpayers do not 
register voluntarily. 
It has been observed however, from previous taxation studies that several SMEs in developing economies are 
non-tax compliant in spite of major reforms (James, Barbour, & Stern, 2007; Ayoki, 2007; Tarkper, 2003) since 
they cannot easily be located by tax administration, yet they pay less tax than their fair share of tax(Ahmed & 
Braithwaite, 2010). Many SME taxpayers do not know the domain of tax professionals since they lack the 
independence and have no tax competency (Nakiwala, 2010).  
According to MoF & MoR (2007), one of the chief features of SMEs is the lower level of the specialist tax 
expertise and greater owner-involvement in day-to-day management and this call for them to search for assistance 
from experts(Bertolini, Borgia, & Siegel, 2010). Consequently, local governments like Lira is still characterized 
by the low local revenue tax compliance levels, in the face of the numerous advocacies for voluntary tax 
compliance (Ayoki, 2008; Bird, 2004). Lira district Local Governments has adopted tax compliance administrative 
measures like penalties, rates and tax audits to ensure tax enforcement instead of compliance(Kayaga, 2007), which 
have still failed to yield.  
Nkote et al (2013) added that, the dimensions of taxpayers’ registration include: -willingness to register, 
taxpayers’ identification, assessment basis, audits taxpayers’ books of accounts to ensure compliance with 
registration and penalty of non-registration. 
2.2.2 Timely Reporting 
According to OECD (2008), compliance with reporting requirement means that the taxpayer report at the proper 
time and that the report accurately report tax liability in accordance with the Internal Revenue code, regulation and 
court decisions applicable at the time the report is made. This clearly states the line between tax compliance and 
noncompliance; yet, tax compliance requires adequate record keeping.  Consequently, a taxpayer can fail to 
comply either because he has made an honest mistake while reporting, or because he wanted to evade his tax 
liabilities from the beginning. Whether the taxpayer made an honest mistake or intentional omission, the result is 
the same. For this reason, noncompliance includes situations where individuals underpaid or overpaid their taxes, 
called underreporting or over-reporting. 
Kogler et al (2012), model predicts that taxpayers will voluntarily report more income in response to either 
an increase in the probability of being detected, or an increase in the penalty imposed on those who are caught. 
However, the model is inconclusive in predicting the response to an increase in the tax rate; the net response is the 
sum of two terms in their model one negative (suggesting a decrease in income reported as the tax rate increases), 
and another, which is most probably positive, assuming that taxpayers’ risk aversion decreases with income. 
Kogler et al liken these two terms to a positive income effect and a negative substitution effect. They reason that 
the substitution effect means that an increase in the tax rate makes it more profitable to underreport income at the 
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margin (i.e., the higher the tax rate, the more money is retained when one underreports a dollar of income). The 
income effect, however, is most likely positive because an increase in the tax rate reduces net income, and 
assuming decreasing absolute risk aversion, the taxpayer is less willing to underreport income than before. Which 
of these two effects is stronger depends in part on the taxpayer’s degree of risk aversion. 
2.2.3 Timely Payment of All Tax Obligations 
The most important aspect of compliance and its goal is revenue collection procedures (OECD, 2008). Collection 
procedures involve collecting money from taxpayers. In most of the developing countries, little revenue is raised 
due to poor monitoring of promptness in payment, regularity in payment, usage of tax money, fairness and 
transparency in taxpayers treatment, magnitude of tax burden, and knowledge of taxpayers on new development 
in tax laws (Nkote & Tusubira, 2013). Because of the weak monitoring, tax evasion and avoidance are dominant. 
Thus, there is need to strengthen tax administration through improving monitoring time of tax payment so as to 
get better revenue collection performance.  
 
2.3 Local Revenue Performance 
Revenue refers to the total amount of money received by a company from goods and services sold (Parkin, 2012) 
Local revenue is the money income collected from taxes by the local government on behalf of the state. According 
to Bahemuka (2001), Local revenue is the income collected by a Local Government from sources within its 
jurisdiction. Local revenues come from taxes, administrative fees, licenses, and property income. Article 191(2) 
of the constitution of the Republic of Uganda stipulates the fees and taxes to be levied, charged, collected and 
appropriated to include rent, rates, royalties, stamp duties, fees on registration and licensing and any other fees and 
taxes that parliament may prescribe. 
According to the local government finance commission act of 2004, local revenue is important to local 
governments for a number of reasons like promoting the autonomy of local governments, maintaining and 
sustaining investment and savings, meeting the co-funding and borrowing obligations, financial council operations 
(emoluments) and funding other locally prioritized services and projects. (James, Barbour, & Stern, 
2007),contends that the basic collection administrative procedures include identifying and locating tax payers, 
checking on tax payers’ compliance and collection of taxes.  
Revenue collection is one of the key activities in Local Government, MOLG publication, (2003) LGA, 1997, 
section 8(4) provides that the Local Government annual budgets shall reflect all revenues to be collected or 
received by the Local Government for each financial year. Section 79, states that Local Government revenues shall 
be regulated as provided for in the fifth schedule. These legal provisions directly or indirectly provide certain 
people and institutions with roles and responsibilities to monitor local revenue collection in LG’s such as council, 
Chief Administrative Officer (C.A.O) and Resident District Commissioner (R.D.C). Chief Finance Officer 
however, is empowered to monitor in order to ensure that the revenue collectors carryout their duties properly and 
that all revenue due to local governments is collected promptly. 
Local Revenue performance in local government in Uganda has been on a declining trend since the inception 
of decentralization which is linked to inadequate Monitoring of taxpayers’ compliance (Balunywa, Nangoli, 
Mugerwa, Teko, & Mayoke, 2014). However, they do not tell the extent to which monitoring is responsible. Local 
Revenue performance means percentage of budgeted collections that is actually collected and level of tax evasion 
(Drummond, Daal, E, & Oliveira, 2012) 
2.3.1 Proportion of Locally Generated Revenue 
One major administrative problem today for local government councils is unable to collect fully the revenues due 
to them (Fjeldstad, 2013). In Lira District Local Government, as in other local governments in Uganda, Local tax 
administration is characterized by noncompliance problems and this has been hindering Local tax revenue 
Collection performance hence low proportion of local revenue Collection.  
Local revenue performance is the percentage of budgeted collections that is actually collected. Local 
governments are supposed to use their own-revenues to finance local services (Odd-Helge, 2004). He adds that 
local authorities are able to derive revenue from property tax, service tax amongst others; however, it’s important 
to note that taxes not only provide revenue but also act to decrease private investment and consumption. They 
further argue that the advice effects of taxation on private investment and consumption are more significant with 
regard to personal income tax than graduated tax. By impacting on private investment and consumption, taxation 
becomes an important instrument of fiscal policy. The dimensions of proportion of locally generated revenue 
include Review of local tax rates, volume of tax revenue collected, and budgeted collection, impact of local tax 
revenue collection and unit cost of collection (Odd-Helge, 2004). 
2.3.2 Level of Tax Evasion 
Kogler et al. (2012), defines tax evasion as “the deliberate act of breaking the law in order to reduce taxes. It 
involves acts of omission (e.g. failing to report certain revenues) or commission (e.g. false reporting of personal 
expenses as business expenses) and is liable to prosecution and fines”. Taxpayers either decide to declare their 
income honestly, paying their due as required and knowing the amount of money remaining with a sense of security, 
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or they choose the risky option of evading taxes (Nguyễn, 2013). 
Further, tax evasion is a decision that includes incorrect reporting and non-timely reporting of taxable income, 
as well as underreporting due to non-mistakes in filing taxes. If taxpayers fail to provide their correct taxable 
liability to the tax authorities, then they are assumed to be evaders; if taxpayers fail to report on time, then they are 
assumed to be evaders; and if taxpayers’ underreporting is not made due to mistakes in filing taxes (such as 
miscalculations or overestimation of deductions) then they are assumed to be evaders (LUMIR, 2013). 
According to OECD (2008), Compliance with the tax law typically means: (i) true reporting of the tax base, 
(ii) correct computation of the liability, (iii) timely payment of the amounts due. He continues that, the bulk of tax 
evasion involves the first point. Most evaders either do not declare their liability at all, or declare it only in part. 
In the following, we concentrate on the problem faced by an individual who has to decide how much of his tax 
aggregate to report, or whether to report it at all. The focus is on income taxes (which account for a large part of 
fiscal revenue in most countries). However, the insights provided can be applied to other taxes as well. 
Dealing with the problem of tax evasion requires at least some understanding of the factors underlying the 
individual taxpayer’s decision whether to pay or evade taxes. However, little is known about tax compliance 
behavior in local government. This study attempts to explore factors that determine Taxpayers’ compliance 
behavior in selected local government.  
 
3.0 Methodology 
3.1 Research Design 
The researcher adopted a descriptive Survey design. Cross sectional design was used to collect opinion from 
different respondents at once. The study was descriptive to allow the researcher to discover patterns in the 
respondents thinking and also to describe issues from their own point of view. A triangular method was used where 
both qualitative and quantitative approaches was considered. Quantitative approach was used to analyze primary 
data from the field using descriptive statistics while qualitative approach was used to describe occurrences and 
discussion in relationship to interview results. The researcher also used correlations design to establish relation 
between variables. 
 
3.2 Population, Sample Size and procedures 
Using R.V. Krejcie and D.W. Morgan (1970) table, 169 respondents were considered, comprising of 107 from 
technocrats and 62 from political leaders randomly and purposively selected from study population of 191 tax 
administrators, which are 121 technocrats and 70 political leaders coming from Lira District Local Government 
Head Quarter, Lira Municipal Council, Ogur Sub County, Lira Sub County, Amac Sub County, Adekokwok Sub 
County and Ngetta Sub County. These included LC III, LC IV and LC V council members. The technical members 
of staff included Chief Administrative Officers, the Sub-County Chiefs, Town Clerks and Assistant Town Clerks, 
Accountants, Revenue Collection Officers, Accounts Officers.  
Table 1: Sample Size 
S/no Categories Target Population Sample Size Technique 
1 Chief Administrative Officer 1 1 Purposive Sampling 
2 Town Clerk 1 1 Purposive Sampling 
3. Assistant Town Clerks 4 4 Purposive Sampling 
4. Sub county Chiefs 5 5 Purposive Sampling 
5. Accounts Personnel 55 48 Random Sampling 
6. Revenue Collection Officers 55 48 Random Sampling 
7. District Chairperson 1 1 Purposive Sampling 
8. Division Chairpersons 4 4 Purposive Sampling 
9. Sub county Chairpersons 5 5 Purposive Sampling 
10 Local Councilors 60 52 Random Sampling 
 Total 191 169  
Source: Primary Data 
 
3.3 Instrument for data collection 
The instruments of data collection used include questionnaire, key informant guide  
Questionnaire was used because it enabled the researcher to collect a large amount of data from the respondents 
within a short time. The questionnaire was designed in such a way that, it allows to be completed by the respondents 
with minimal supervision. All variable items had closed-ended with five-point likert scale of 5“Strongly Disagree”, 
4“Disagree”, 3“Not Sure, 2“Agree” and 1“Strongly Agree”.  
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Table 2: Mean Range of Likert Scale 
Mean Range Scale Interpretation 
4.20 – 5.00 5 Very High 
3.40 – 4.20 4 High 
2.60 – 3.40 3 Moderate 
1.80 – 2.60 2 Low 
1.00 – 1.80 1 Very Low 
The Key Informant Guide as instrument helped to obtain some information that might not had been captured 
from primary respondents. A key Informant Interview guide was to help the researcher get additional information 
Lira District Local Government Leaders. Chief Administrative Officer, Town Clerk, 4 Assistant Town Clerks, 5 
Sub County Chiefs, 5 Sub County Chairpersons, and  4 Division Chairpersons. Accounting Officers were chosen 
because of their knowledge on information regarding the variable of the study and being the head of technocrats.  
Chairpersons were chosen because they are the head of political leaders who are the policy makers.  
 
3.4 Reliability and Validity 
A pilot study was carried out to ensure validity of data collection instruments. This was done with the help of an 
expert (the researcher’s supervisor) to edit the questionnaire and the interview guide. The researcher forwarded 
the structured questionnaire to the supervisor who is an expert in the area covered by the research for editing and 
reviewing to ensure that all items constructed could help achieve the aim of the study. CVI > 0.6, then the 
instrument was considered valid since validity was equal to 0.82 which is greater than 0.6. 
CVI =   Valid items 
                 Total Number of items 
 =   31  
               38 
=  0.82 
The reliability was ensured by testing the instruments for the reliability of values (Alpha values) as 
recommended by Cronbatch, (1946). Cronbatch recommends analysis for Alpha values for each variable under 
study.  A Conbach Alpha (0.91) greater than 0.7 proved reliability (Amin, 2005) 
Table 3: Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach’s Alpha No of Items 
0.91 5 
Source: primary data 
The instrument was considered reliable because the coefficient of the Cronbach’s alpha generated was greater 
than 0.7 as it is recommended by Amin (2005). This indicates that the instrument used to collect data from 
respondents were consistent and reliable. 
 
3.5 Data Analysis 
Data collected was checked and edited for completeness and accuracy. The data was then analyzed using the IBM 
statistical package for social scientists (SPSS) version 20 for Windows. Research question 1 and 2 were analyzed 
using descriptive statistics where mean and standard deviation were employed. Objective 3, the researcher used 
Pearson’s correlation matrix to seek relationships between Monitoring Taxpayers’ Compliance and Local Revenue 
Collection Performance. The hypothesis was tested using P-Value of Pearson Coefficient Correlation at 0.05 
significant levels. A Multiple linear regression model was used to predict Local Revenue Performance using the 
three independent variables in the study; effective Taxpayers’ Registration, Timely Reporting and Timely payment 
of all tax obligations. 
 
4.0 Results and Discussions 
4.1 Sample characteristics 
With regards to the respondent gender, the male respondents dominated the study at 117(69.2%) while female 
were at 52(30.8%) implying that the findings were influenced by male respondents. Table 4 further indicated that 
majority of respondents 69(40.8%) were between (36-45) years old, implying that they were mature enough to 
give positive information since they are considered knowledgeable on the subject matter of study. With regard to 
education, majority of the respondents were Certificate/Diploma holders 90(53.3%) implying that the researcher 
was confident of the results got because all these respondents were able to understand the items in the questionnaire. 
Regarding position held by respondents, 107(63.3%) were technical staff while 62(36.7%) were political leaders 
implying that technocrats were more involved in monitoring taxpayer’ compliance than political leaders since 
political leaders formulate policies on taxpayers’ compliance and technocrats implement and regarding number of 
years worked, Table 4 also revealed that majority  72(42.6%) of the respondents had worked for over ten (10) 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.8, No.22, 2017 
 
13 
years implying that they were more experienced and in position to objectively provide much of the information on 
the study areas. This implies that they had the experience on the subject matter of the study. 
Table 4: Demographic Characteristics of the respondents 
Items Response Frequency Percent 
Gender Male 117 69.2 
 Female 52 30.8 
Age bracket 18 – 25 5 3.0 
 26 – 35 50 29.6 
 36 – 45 69 40.8 
 46 – 55 43 25.4 
 56+ 2 1.2 
Education Certificate/Diploma 90 53.3 
 Bachelor 62 36.7 
 Master 14 8.3 
 Others 3 1.8 
Position Technocrat 107 63.3 
 Political Leaders 62 36.7 
Experience 1 – 3 26 15.4 
 4 – 6 45 26.6 
 7 – 10 26 15.4 
 10+ 72 42.6 
N= 169 
 
4.2 The Level of Monitoring Taxpayers’ Compliance  
The level of Monitoring Taxpayers’ Compliance in Lira District Local Government was measured using effective 
taxpayers’ registration, timely reporting, and timely payment of all tax obligations. This objective was analyzed 
using the mean and standard deviation. The mean shows the occurrences of a response while standard deviation 
portrays the extent to which the scores deviate from the mean. The detail of the findings is as shown in table 5 
below; 
Table 5:  Effective Registration of Taxpayers’ Registration 
Items Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Interpretation 
Taxpayers register willingly 2.47 1.20 Low 
All taxpayers who are identified get registered on time 2.71 1.09 Moderate 
The assessment of taxpayers is done based on their income 3.73 1.13 Moderate 
Surveys to identify taxpayers are carried out on annual basis 3.77 1.06 Moderate 
Examining of a firm’s financial statements and accounting records is a 
basis used when assessment is being done 
3.25 1.13 Moderate 
The sub county/district is effective in identifying and registering all 
potential taxpayers 
3.42 1.03 Moderate 
The identification methods are effective in registering all potential 
taxpayers 
3.23 1.19 Moderate 
Lira District Local Government audits books of accounts to ensure 
compliance with registration 
3.57 1.14 Moderate 
All taxpayers who are Identified get registered on time 2.71 1.09 Moderate 
Aggregate Mean and Std Deviation 3.21 1.12 Moderate 
N=169 
Legend: 1.00 – 1.79  Very low, 1.80 – 2.59  Low, 2.60 - 3.39 Moderate, 3.40 – 4.19 High, 4.20 – 5.00 
Very High 
With regards to effective registration of taxpayers, the results indicated ineffective taxpayers’ registration 
because most of the respondents thought that taxpayers’ registration was not effective at a mean of Mean ( x
=3.21), which is moderate. The high standard deviation of (s = 1.12) shows disparity or non-coherent in the opinion 
of the respondents regarding the subject matter. This inadequacy of registration is attributed to taxpayers’ 
unwillingness to register for tax purposes on the side of taxpayers which is indicated low, inadequate assessment 
of taxpayers based on their income, inadequate identification of taxpayer and inadequate audits of taxpayers’ books 
of accounts to ensure compliance with registration. Studies carried out put emphasis on effective registration of 
taxpayers in Local Government in order to increase the base, (Kogler, Batrancea, Nichita, Pántya, Belianin, & 
Kirchler, 2012) since many small and medium taxpayers do not register voluntarily (Nkote & Tusubira, 2013). In 
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an interview with Chief Administrative Officer, Taxpayers’ do not willingly register and the district does not have 
enough resources to facilitate monitoring of taxpayer’ compliance with registration “Inadequate funds hinder the 
district to carry out audits of taxpayers’ books of accounts to ensure compliance with registration” he said. 
Table 6: Timely Reporting 
Items Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Interpretation 
Taxpayers report willingly 2.02 1.02 Low 
Taxpayers keep up to date transaction records and books of accounts 2.41 1.16 Low 
Taxpayers report to Lira District Local Government/Sub County for 
assessment of tax liability 
2.45 0.98 Low 
Taxpayers disclose all income earned for tax purposes 2.04 1.02 Low 
Taxpayers understand the penalties for late or no reporting 3.11 1.20 Moderate 
There are sufficient resources to audit all taxpayers 2.80 1.03 Moderate 
Taxpayers’ promptly declare their income to Lira District Local 
Government 
1.97 0.91 Low 
Aggregate Mean and Std Deviation 2.40 1.05 Low 
N=169 
Legend: 1.00 – 1.79  Very low, 1.80 – 2.59  Low, 2.60 - 3.39 Moderate, 3.40 – 4.19 High, 4.20 – 5.00 
Very High 
With regard to reporting, the finding indicated that there is low reporting by taxpayers as most of the 
respondents indicated low reporting at a mean of ( x = 2.40) and (s = 1.05) with regards to scale used in the study, 
indicating inadequacy of monitoring reporting process of taxpayers in Lira district Local Government. The high 
standard deviation shows disparity or non-coherent in the opinion of the respondents regarding the subject matter. 
The Mean could mean Taxpayers are not willing to report for tax purpose and those who report do not do it in time 
of reporting and even they do not report honestly for many under report their income for tax purposes due to 
inadequacy of accounting records for reporting by taxpayers.  Studies carried out state that, tax reporting 
compliance requires adequate record keeping, for a taxpayer can fail to comply either because he has made an 
honest mistake while reporting because he lacked record, or because he wanted to evade his tax liabilities from the 
beginning because noncompliance with reporting means situations where individuals underpaid or overpaid their 
taxes, called underreporting or over-reporting (OECD, 2008). 
In an interview with the District Revenue Officer he said that taxpayers are not willing to report for tax 
purposes and those who report do not report honestly “many under report their income for tax purposes” he said. 
However, inline with Kogler et al (2012), model predicts that taxpayers voluntarily report more income in response 
to either an increase in the probability of being detected, or an increase in the penalty imposed on those who are 
caught meaning that since, the taxpayers are unwilling to report through monitoring of their reporting process since 
it increases their probability of being detected hence improvement on compliance on reporting. 
Table7: Timely Payment of all tax Obligation 
Items Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Interpretation 
Taxpayers always pay their taxes in time 2.40 1.06 Moderate 
Taxpayers are reminded to pay their tax obligations when they delay 3.69 0.97 High 
Taxpayers are aware of the consequences of nonpayment of Local tax 3.40 1.167 High 
Taxpayers do not pay their taxes regularly 3.37 1.17 Moderate 
Taxpayers are well educated on their tax obligations 2.80 1.10 Moderate 
Payment mode of taxes is friendly to taxpayers 2.94 1.21 Moderate 
Taxpayers delay to pay taxes 3.82 0.96 High 
Taxpayers pay actual tax amount assessed 2.72 1.17 Moderate 
Taxpayers understand the penalties for non-payment of all tax 
obligations 
2.93 1.18 Moderate 
Aggregate Mean and Std Deviation 3.12 1.11 Moderate 
N=169 
Legend: 1.00 – 1.79  Very low, 1.80 – 2.59  Low, 2.60 - 3.39 Moderate, 3.40 – 4.19 High, 4.20 – 5.00 
Very High 
With regard to reporting, the finding indicated that there is moderate timely payment of all tax obligation by 
taxpayers as most of the respondents indicated moderate timely payment of all tax obligation at a mean of ( x  = 
3.12) and (s = 1.11) with regards to scale used in the study, indicating inadequacy of monitoring Timely payment 
of all tax obligation process of taxpayers and high standard deviation shows disparity or non-coherent in the 
opinion of the respondents regarding the subject matter. This could be due to political pressure on the local tax 
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administration to relax on monitoring taxpayers’ compliance (Balunywa, Nangoli, Mugerwa, Teko, & Mayoke, 
2014). Lira district local government may lack qualified personnel to carry out the Monitoring of Taxpayers’ 
Timely Payment of tax obligation or lack of resources to carry out the monitoring of taxpayers’ timely payment of 
tax obligation such as airtime to make a follow up on taxpayers’ payment.  
Table 8: Summary of Monitoring Taxpayer’s Compliance 
Item Aggregate Mean Std. Deviation Interpretation 
Effective Taxpayers’ Registration 3.21 1.12 Moderate 
Timely Reporting 2.40 1.05 Low 
Timely Payment of Tax obligation 3.12 1.11 Moderate 
Grand Mean and Std Deviation 2.91 1.09 Moderate 
N=169 
Legend: 1.00 – 1.79  Very low, 1.80 – 2.59  Low, 2.60 - 3.39 Moderate, 3.40 – 4.19 High, 4.20 – 5.00 
Very High 
In summary, the findings revealed that Taxpayers Compliance (Effective Taxpayers’ Registration, Timely 
Reporting and Timely Payment of Tax obligation) in Lira District Local Government is moderately monitored 
with mean at ( x = 2.91) indicating a moderate mean as per legend scale used in the study, implying that monitoring 
taxpayers’ compliance by Lira District Local Government is inadequate. The high standard deviation of (s = 1.09) 
shows disparity or non-coherent in the opinion of the respondents regarding the subject matter. The inadequate 
monitoring of taxpayers’ compliance by Lira District Local Government could be due to ineffectiveness of 
Taxpayers’ Registration, Taxpayers not reporting promptly and Taxpayers not paying their all their tax obligation 
on time (Nkote & Tusubira, 2013; Kogler, Batrancea, Nichita, Pántya, Belianin, & Kirchler, 2012; Balunywa, 
Nangoli, Mugerwa, Teko, & Mayoke, 2014) Yet Monitoring Taxpayers’ Compliance and deterring noncompliance 
requires establishing both a reasonable risk of detection as well as applying penalties effectively. The ideal 
approach is to combine these measures so as to maximize their effect on compliance as it were, to move a country 
from a “low compliance to a high compliance environment” (OSEBE, 2013). 
In an interview with the Chief Administrative Officer, Lira District Local Government in the process of 
monitoring taxpayers’ compliance makes follow up on taxpayers registration, reporting and payment of obligation 
and in the process of making a follow-up, Lira District Local Government meet taxpayers and carryout tax 
education and awareness of taxpayers on the collection, utilization and accountability of local revenues. However, 
Lira respondents indicate less success, due to too much political interference in the running of work by technocrats 
who said that councilors were not well educated and knowledgeable about government programmes. More still, 
No penalty for noncompliance and no enforcement coupled with high cost of monitoring has made the district not 
to carry out monitoring of taxpayers successfully. 
 
4.3 The Level of Local Revenue Performance 
The second objective of the study was to determine the level of Local Revenue Performance. This objective was 
analyzed using mean and standard deviation.  The specific variables investigated under this, included proportion 
of tax and the level of tax evasion. The detail of the findings is as shown in the table below; 
Table 9: Proportion of tax 
 Items Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Interpretation 
Lira District Local Government reviews the rates/charges of Local tax 
frequently 
3.16 1.11 Moderate 
Impact of the Local tax collected on tax revenue collection is 
computed 
3.54 .98 Moderate 
Local tax collection in terms of volume has increased tremendously 3.25 .81 Moderate 
During local taxpayers monitoring, cost of providing the service is put 
into consideration 
3.37 1.04 Moderate 
Aggregate Mean and Std. Deviation  3.33 0.99 Moderate 
 
N=169 
Legend: 1.00 – 1.79  Very low, 1.80 – 2.59  Low, 2.60 - 3.39 Moderate, 3.40 – 4.19 High, 4.20 – 5.00 
Very High 
With regards to proportion of tax, the results indicated that Moderate proportion of tax from Local Revenue 
Collection. This is because most of the respondents thought that proportion of tax at a mean of Mean ( x  = 3.33), 
which is a moderate. The high standard deviation of (s = 0.99) shows disparity or non-coherent in the opinion of 
the respondents regarding the subject matter.  The moderate proportion of tax is attributed to lack of taxpayers’ 
satisfaction with Payment mode, usage of tax money, transparency in their treatment and magnitude of tax burden 
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(rates/charges of local tax) which may be seen high. Furthermore this could be as a result Lira District Local 
Government council’s inability to collect Local revenues due to them which is similar to the finding that many 
Local Government councils today do have the ability to collect fully the revenues due to them (Fjeldstad, 2013). 
From interviews, the low revenue performance is attributed to lack of enforcement, political interference by 
politicians, no penalties for tax defaulters. In an interview with Revenue Tax Officer, there is low revenue 
performance in Lira District due to the fact that they only carry out tax education and it is upon the taxpayers to 
pay or not to pay for they do not enforce unlike Uganda Revenue Authority. 
Another dimension of Local Revenue Performance besides the proportion of tax is tax evasion.  The detail of 
the findings is as shown in the table 10 below; 
Table 10: Tax Evasion 
Items Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Interpretation 
There is adequate information on tax evasion 2.74 .91 Moderate 
Tax payers evade Local tax because rates are high 3.02 1.07 Moderate 
Tax payers evade Local tax because they do not get value for their 
money 
3.01 1.23 Moderate 
Tax payers understand their civic responsibility to pay taxes 3.05 1.09 Moderate 
Those who evade paying tax repeatedly receives  Punishment 2.90 1.23 Moderate 
Lira District Local Government has been successful in dealing with tax 
evasion over the last 5 years 
2.70 1.00 Moderate 
Tax evasion is on the increase Lira District Local Government 2.92 .93 Moderate 
Tax evasion is a minor crime Lira District Local Government 2.63 1.08 Moderate 
Lira District Local Government is able to detect people evading tax 3.17 1.15 Moderate 
Aggregate Mean and Std. Deviation  2.90 1.08 Moderate 
N=169 
Legend: 1.00 – 1.79  Very low, 1.80 – 2.59  Low, 2.60 - 3.39 Moderate, 3.40 – 4.19 High, 4.20 – 5.00 
Very High 
With regards to Tax Evasion, the results indicated that there is a moderate level of tax evasion. This is because 
most of the respondents thought that tax evasion at a mean of Mean ( x = 2.90), which is a moderate. The high 
standard deviation of (s = 1.08) shows disparity or non-coherent in the opinion of the respondents regarding the 
subject matter.  The moderate level of tax evasion is attributed to the fact that Lira District Local government is 
not able to detect tax evasion, and deal with it (punish tax evaders). 
In an interview with District Revenue Officer, Lira District does not levy penalties on tax evaders but once 
they are discovered they are asked to pay their arrears only. Furthermore, it may be attributed to Taxpayer not 
declaring their income for tax purpose honestly or under reporting. For tax evasion involves acts of omission (e.g. 
failing to report certain revenues) or commission (e.g. false reporting of personal expenses as business expenses) 
and is liable to prosecution and fines” (Kogler, Batrancea, Nichita, Pántya, Belianin, & Kirchler, 2012). If 
taxpayers fail to provide their correct taxable liability to the tax authorities, then they are assumed to be evaders; 
if taxpayers fail to report on time, then they are assumed to be evaders; and if taxpayers’ underreporting is not 
made due to mistakes in filing taxes (such as miscalculations or overestimation of deductions) then they are 
assumed to be evaders (LUMIR, 2013). 
Table 11: Summary of level of Local Revenue Performance 
Item Aggregate Mean Std. Deviation Interpretation 
Proportion of tax 3.33 0.99 Moderate 
Tax Evasion 2.90 1.08 Moderate 
Grand Mean and Std Deviation 3.12 1.04 Moderate 
 
Legend: 1.00 – 1.79  Very low, 1.80 – 2.59  Low, 2.60 - 3.39 Moderate, 3.40 – 4.19 High, 4.20 – 5.00 
Very High 
In summary the findings revealed that there is moderate level of Local Revenue Performance in Lira District 
Local Government with mean at ( x  = 3.12) indicating a moderate mean as per legend scale used in the study. The 
high standard deviation of (s = 1.04) shows disparity or non-coherent in the opinion of the respondents regarding 
the subject matter. The mean confirms that there is low Local Revenue Performance in Local Government as was 
asserted (Tumushabe, Elijah, Lillian, Daniel, & Eugene, 2010; Balunywa, Nangoli, Mugerwa, Teko, & Mayoke, 
2014) This low Local Revenue Performance could be due to Lira District Local Government councils’ inability to 
collect local revenues due to them which is similar to the finding that many Local Government councils today do 
have the ability to collect fully the revenues due to them (Fjeldstad, 2013). (Fjeldstad, 2013) Or taxpayers evading 
taxes in Lira District (Kogler, Batrancea, Nichita, Pántya, Belianin, & Kirchler, 2012) 
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4.4 Relationship between Monitoring Taxpayers’ Compliance  
The third objective of the study was to establish the relationship between Monitoring Taxpayers’ Compliance and 
Local Revenue Performance. This objective was analyzed using Pearson correlation logistic linear regression in 
examining the relationship and the extent of the relationship between the two variables. Regression was used to 
help determine the contribution of each construct towards Local Revenue Performance. The results in the table 
below indicate the Pearson (r) correlation coefficients for the variables and these were Taxpayers’ Compliance 
and Local Revenue Performance. A positive relationship between any two variables indicates that an increment in 
one variable brings about an increment in the other. On the other hand, if an increment in one variable causes a 
decrease in the other variable, then there is a negative relationship between the two variables. 
Table 12: Relationship between Monitoring Taxpayers’ Compliance and LRP 
 r .727** 
P -Value .000 
N 169 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Source: Primary Data 
Results reveals that there is positive and significant relationship between Monitoring Taxpayers’ Compliance 
and Local Revenue Performance (r = 0.727**, P=.000). This strong positive relation implies that adequate 
Monitoring of Taxpayers’ Compliance ensures better Local Revenue Collection Performance. This result is in 
agreement with OCED (2008) which advocates to tax bodies for monitoring Taxpayers’ Compliance in order to 
improve on Local Revenue Collection Performance. When it comes to the extent to which this relationship exists 
as seen from the Pearson Correlation table by the use of adjusted R square, this implies that Monitoring Taxpayers’ 
Compliance contributes 52.9% to Local Revenue Performance in Lira district Local Government, the remaining 
47.1% is as a result of other factors that were not considered in this study which still need to be established too. 
This means that there are other factors that the monitoring Taxpayers compliance should interrelate with such that 
high Local Revenue in Lira district Local Government is realized.  
 
4.5 Extent of Monitoring Taxpayers’ Compliance on Local Revenue Performance 
Multiple Regression analysis revealed the extent to which Monitoring Taxpayers’ Compliance predicted Local 
Revenue Performance in Lira district Local Government as shown in the table below 
















(Constant) 1.543 .377  4.090 .000 
Effective Taxpayers’ 
Registration 
.400 .125 .214 3.201 .002 
Timely Reporting .544 .107 .334 5.086 .000 
Timely payment of all tax 
Obligation 
.672 .124 .344 5.412 .000 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Local Revenue Performance 
Source: Primary Data 
In the multiple regressions the model takes the form of an equation that contains a coefficient (b) for each 
independent variable. The first part of the table gives us estimates for b values indicating individual contribution 
of each of the independent variables to the model. The beta value tells us about the relationship between monitoring 
taxpayers’ Compliance and Local Revenue Performance in Lira district Local Government. The result indicated 
that there was a positive significant relationship between Effective Taxpayers’ Registration and Local Revenue 
Performance in Lira District evidenced by the P-value (sig. = 0.02) being less than 0.05 level of significance. When 
it comes to the extent to which this relationship exists, Effective Taxpayers’ Registration contributes 0.214 (21.4%) 
to Local Revenue Performance in Lira district Local Government. The result indicated that there was a positive 
significant relationship between Timely Reporting and Local Revenue Performance in Lira District evidenced by 
the P-value (sig. = 0.00) being less than 0.05 level of significance. When it comes to the extent to which this 
relationship exists, Timely Reporting contributes 0.334 (33.4%) to Local Revenue Performance in Lira district 
Local Government. 
The result indicated that there was a positive significant relationship between Timely payment of all tax 
Obligation and Local Revenue Performance in Lira District evidenced by the P-value (sig. = 0.00) being less than 
0.05 level of significance. When it comes to the extent to which this relationship exists, Timely payment of all tax 
Obligation contributes 0.344 (34.4%) to Local Revenue Performance in Lira district Local Government. 
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4.6 Testing of the Hypothesis 
The null hypothesis was tested using the p – value, where if the p – value is less than the level of significance, then 
the null hypothesis is rejected. The null Hypothesis that there is no relationship between Monitoring taxpayers’ 
Compliance and Local Revenue Performance was rejected because the p – value of 0.000 was less than the level 
of significance of 0.05. The alternative hypothesis that there is a significant relationship between Monitoring 
Taxpayers’ Compliance and Local Revenue Performance is adopted. 
 
5.0 Conclusion 
There is moderate Level of Monitoring Taxpayers’ Compliance and Low Revenue Performance Lira District Local 
Government. The moderate Level of Monitoring Taxpayers’ Compliance has led to Low revenue Performance 
Lira District Local Government compels the researcher to reject the null hypothesis, and concluded that there is 
positive significant relationship between Monitoring Taxpayers’ Compliance and Local Revenue Performance in 
Lira District Local Government. 
 
6.0 Recommendations 
Basing on the above findings and conclusion, the researcher therefore recommends that; The district should 
consider empowering of taxpayers with relevant knowledge and skills considered vital in the expedition of their 
tax obligations with easy and to enable them be aware of their moral obligation to register for tax purposes, report 
promptly for tax purposes, timely payment of tax obligation. There should be massive sensitization programs to 
increase awareness, educate the public and remind taxpayers that they are partners, as opposed to mere subjects 
forced to pay taxes. In addition to the above, the researcher also recommends that political leaders should be 
restricted from interfering with the work of technical staff. This study also recommends that councilors in Local 
Governments should offer voluntary services to their communities and not work with the expectation of being paid; 
this will help reduce pressure on the already limited resources that local councils have to do community work.  
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